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Incentives for Litigation or Settlement
in Large Tort Cases:Responding to
Insurance Company Intransigence
Jay M. Feinman*

The purposes of this article are (1) to describe some ways in
which the practices of insurance companies in settlement
negotiations and the decision to settle or litigate in large tort cases
disserve the objectives of tort law; and (2) to suggest genuine tort
reforms to better align the dynamics with the objectives. By
"large tort cases" I mean individual cases (excluding mass torts
and class actions) in which there is significant personal injury or
death to individuals. Typically these are what lawyers would
think of as six- or seven-figure damages cases.
I. THE DYNAMICS OF SETTLEMENT AND LITIGATION

Begin with an idealized picture of the tort system. The
familiar objectives of tort law are (1) providing incentives for safe
behavior;
unsafe
unreasonable,
deterring
and
behavior
compensating the victims of wrongfully imposed harm, and (2)
fairness. These objectives are served by imposing liability on
wrongdoers and assessing damages at a level that imposes on the
wrongdoer the cost of the harm to the victim.
In the overwhelming majority of tort cases, the defendant is
It provides a fund for
Insurance is beneficial.
insured. 1
*Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden.
The Symposium on Genuine Tort Reform of which this Article is a part was
supported by a grant from the Robert L. Habush Endowment, for which I am
grateful. Thanks also to the participants in the Symposium, Roger Williams
University School of Law, Jordan Rand, and members of the Academy of
Trial Advocacy.
1. See Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money and the Moral Economy of
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compensating the victim that might not otherwise be available
because of a judgment-proof defendant.

It also often spurs

settlement, in part, because it aligns the interest of the victim and
the defendant in a prompt settlement within policy limits,
particularly in light of the widespread practice under which the
victim accepts the policy limits as a limit on damages and does not
pursue the defendant for any further compensation. 2
In an ideal system, settlement is an effective proxy for
litigation, in that either litigation or settlement attaches liability
to the proper party and fixes damages in the appropriate amount.
Taking the big qualification of putting aside the public values of
litigation (such as the establishment of rules to regulate future
conduct, the pronouncement of public norms, and the moral
vindication of victims), settlement is even preferred to litigation
because of its lower transaction costs. 3

Against this background, there are two principal models of
the dynamics of settlement. The first model views settlement as
an economic negotiation in which the principal determinant of the
decision to settle is the parties' calculation of the expected value of
the claim. The second model suggests that other factors in the
bargaining process are as important or more important in deciding
whether a case will be settled.
Under the economic model of settlement, parties are assumed
to calculate the expected value of the litigation by discounting the
ultimate expected award by the probability of success in litigation
and factoring in the effect of litigation costs. 4 When the expected
Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SoC'YREV. 275, 275 (2001).
2. See id. at 314.
3. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study
of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 319, 320 (1991) [hereinafter Getting to No] ("A trial is a failure ....
With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that
pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.");
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1996) [hereinafter
Don't Try]; Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining:An Inquiry
into the Selection of Settlement and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY
L.J. 619, 620-21 (2006) [hereinafter Price Theory].

4. See RICHARD A.

POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW

607-15 (5th ed.

1998); STEVEN A. SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40111 (2004); Getting to No, supra note 3, at 323-27; Price Theory, supra note 3,
at 629-32. For criticism in addition to that suggested by the bargaining
model discussed next, see Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal
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values of the parties overlap, there is an opportunity for
settlement. Party error, differences in risk preferences, the stakes
of the case, and other factors may make settlement more or less
likely, but settlement is largely "a function of transaction cost
5
economics."
The bargaining theory model argues that economic theory
does not capture all of the elements that are important in
settlement dynamics, and that in many cases elements other than6
the expected value of the litigation will be more important.
These other elements include more pronounced risk preferences of
the parties, other differences in how they value the outcome of the
litigation, transaction costs and the litigants' ability to bear them,
and strategic behavior in the bargaining process. 7 Therefore, an
overlap of the parties' expected values is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for settlement.
The bargaining theory model in particular yields predictions
about the bargaining situation in large tort cases. In these cases,
insurance companies as repeat players face victims as oneshotters. 8 Although the defendant is the nominal adverse party
and the defendant is represented by counsel, the insurance
company is typically the key player in the settlement and
litigation process. Under the liability policy, the insurer assumes
the defense of its insured and exerts effective control over the
defense counsel through the "commodification" of insurance
defense practice. 9 The companies are likely to be hard bargainers,
Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (2007) [hereinafter Effect of Risk]; Robert
J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125 (2008) [hereinafter Tort
Arbitrage].
Recent empirical work
5. Price Theory, supra note 3, at 632.
demonstrates that the expected value is not the expected value of a judgment
after trial, discounted by probability and litigation costs, but the expected
payout, which is usually less than the judgment. David Hyman et al., Do
Defendants Pay What JuriesAward? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical
Malpractice Cases, 1988-2003, 4 J.
[hereinafter Haircuts].

Empirical

Legal

Stud. 3

(2007)

6. For a summary, see Getting to No, supranote 3, at 327-30.
7. Id. at 328.
8. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that
Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in Action, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 10 (2005)
[hereinafter Six Ways].

9.

Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance Defense

Practice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2053 (2006) [hereinafter Commodification]. See

Herbert M. Kritzer, Defending Torts: What Should We Know?, 1 J. TORT L.
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in order to establish their reputation and to discourage easy
claims. Hard bargaining includes making no or very low offers
and being willing to take cases to trial. However, other factors
mitigate in favor of settlement. Because of the precedential effects
(as legal precedents and as guideposts for future bargaining) and
the portfolio effects of very large losses, companies are more likely
to settle likely losers and to litigate likely winners. 10 Victims are
likely to be in need of the recovery in the case, to have less
financial staying power and to be involved in only the single case
rather than a portfolio of cases; therefore, they are likely to be risk
averse and more inclined to settle early for a lower amount. 11 The
scales are somewhat balanced because victims are represented by
lawyers on a contingency fee basis; these lawyers are repeat
players and can treat each individual case as part of a portfolio of
12
cases.
There are numerous conflicts built into this system. 13 There
is a conflict between the victim and the victim's lawyer, because
the lawyer finances the case while most of the benefit of added
investment accrues to the client; this conflict is addressed by the
rules of professional responsibility and the norms of
professionalism that require the lawyer to act in the client's
interest. 14 There are conflicts among the defendant, the insurance
company, and the lawyer hired by the company to represent the
defendant. The key conflict for present purposes is between the
company and the defendant, particularly in cases in which the
potential damages exceed the policy limits. In cases in which the
expected value of the litigation exceeds the policy limits, the
insurance company has less incentive to settle. This lack of
incentive works to the detriment of the insured defendant, who is
at least theoretically responsible for the excess, 15 and of the
(2006),

http://www.bepress.com/jtl/voll/iss3/art3

[hereinafter

Defending

Torts].

10. Don't Try, supra note 3, at 53; Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational

Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2000).

11. Don't Try, supra note 3, at 48-56.
12. Id.
13. See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Defense Lawyers:

From Triangles to Tetrahedrons,4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997-1998).
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT MR1.3 (1983)

15. I say "theoretically" because in many cases the victim does not
proceed against the defendant for the excess judgment, either because of
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victim, for whom the insurance coverage is the only realistic
source of compensation. 16 This conflict is addressed by the law of
the company to
insurance bad faith, which restricts the ability of
17
own.
its
to
interests
subordinate the defendant's
Summarizing the application of the bargaining models to
large tort cases, there are some distortions of the ideal settlement
process in favor of the defendant and insurance company, but
these distortions are somewhat balanced by the contingency fee
system and the law of bad faith. The large stakes relative to the
litigation costs and the likelihood of strategic behavior by the
insurance company tend to make trials more frequent. However,
the potential for large losses by the insurance company, the risk
aversion of the victim, and the portfolio management strategy of
the victim's lawyer tend toward settlements in the range of
expected values, though perhaps at the lower end of that range.
The results serve the objectives of tort law moderately well,
though far from perfectly. Victims in large cases are somewhat
under-compensated and transaction costs are significant, but in
many cases victims receive substantial compensation from
wrongdoers when insurance companies pay to settle cases and
pass the cost of the settlements on to policyholders in the pricing
of premiums.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF INSURANCE COMPANY INTRANSIGENCE

The problem is that there appears to be a substantial gap
between the predictions about settlement in the literature and the
practice of settlement in large tort cases. In general, this gap can
be described as a failure to appreciate the full consequences of
insurance companies' strategic behavior under the bargaining
model.
A. The Problem
There are a very significant number of large cases, probably

norms in the legal profession, the inadequacy of the defendant's resources, or
the defendant's asset-protection strategies. See Baker, supra note 1, at 275;
Haircuts, supranote 5, at 51-55.
16. Six Ways, supra note 8, at 4-7.
17. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 875-906
(1988).
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an increasing number in the last few years, in which liability is
relatively clear and it is also clear that the victim's damages are
substantial, yet the insurance company refuses to make an offer to
settle the case, makes a disproportionately low offer that it refuses
to raise, or makes an offer only very late in the process.' 8 In the
cases in this group that go to judgment, there is often an award in
excess of the policy limits. If the company does not pay the excess
amount, the defendant (or victim by assignment) must pursue the
bad faith action, which is sometimes successful and sometimes
not. 19 Even if the company ultimately pays the entire judgment,
the victim has suffered substantial costs for which it is not
compensated, such as economic costs incurred because of the delay
in payment and noneconomic costs such as additional emotional
distress. 20 The presence of this problem requires readjustment of
the theories of settlement and, more importantly, means that the
objectives of tort law are being less adequately served than is
ordinarily supposed.
It is difficult to document the extent of this practice. 2 1 Trial
lawyers regard it as widespread; at meetings of trial lawyers at
which I have discussed this issue, practically every lawyer reports
having encountered the phenomenon. Although their reports are
anecdotal, they are persuasive. In recent discussions, for example,
one lawyer reported on a case in which the insurance company
claims representative announced that "even if a verdict higher
than the [multi-million] dollar offer was returned [the company]
could delay payment indefinitely with the appellate process and
there was no telling when our client would ever see any money."
Another reported on "something weird happening" at a major
national insurance company, in that it was "almost impossible to
18. A classic example is the much litigated Campbell v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev'd, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), on
remand, 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004) (discussed at notes 23-26 infra).
19. As a rough approximation, for example, a search of insurance bad faith
cases on Westlaw's Verdict and Settlement Summaries database for 2007
produces figures of 175 plaintiff verdicts, 82 defense verdicts, and 27
settlements.
20. See, e.g., Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882, 894 (Ariz. App. 2004)
(cost and inconvenience of attending settlement conference and emotional
distress, humiliation, inconvenience, or anxiety).
21. Kritzer's account of the state of empirical research on defense
practice presents it as a significant unknown area. Defending Torts, supra
note 9, at 46-50.
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settle cases with them, forcing litigation in almost every case." A
third lawyer described a similar problem with another major
insurer that estimated the amount of claims "under budget, so
even with a good liability case, the case never got the attention
one would expect until just before trial.
Even defense lawyers report this type of behavior among their
insurance company clients:
Another lawyer at [a defense firm] expressed frustration
to me after a no-fault arbitration hearing about handling
cases where the insurer had no good defense. The lawyer
believed that the insurer had made a business decision to
fight such cases as a means of deterring certain classes of
claims even though the insurer should have known that
the claimant who persisted with such a claim would
prevail. A different lawyer described a case he was
working on as a "virtual sure loser"; in the lawyer's view
the type of case involved could be won only when the
that the claimant would
claimant would present so poorly
22
credibility.
of
lack
total
a
have
Also anecdotal but even more persuasive is the evidence of
insurance company intransigence in cases that are reported or
described in news reports. What is most striking about this
evidence is that it exposes the extent to which insurance
companies make a formalized, established practice of this
behavior.
Among the most notorious is the "Performance, Planning and
Review" system used by State Farm and exposed in the series of
punitive damages cases that included the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell.2 3 Justice Kennedy delicately "acknowledged" that
State Farm's decision to take a clear case of liability to trial and
subject its insured to the likelihood of a judgment in excess of the
policy limits "merits no praise." 24 The Utah Supreme Court
provided more details. In the particular case, State Farm refused
several times to settle the case within the policy limits even
though its own investigator had concluded there was evidence of
22. Commodification,supra note 9, at 2084.
23. 538 U.S. at 414-15.
24. Id. at 419.
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the insured's
fault;
instead,
State
Farm's
divisional
superintendent "ordered [the investigator] to change the portion of
his report describing the facts of the accident and his analysis of
liability 'wherein [he] had indicated an exposure [for the
defendant], and that there could be a high settlement value on
it."' 25 More generally:

First, State Farm repeatedly and deliberately deceived
and cheated its customers via the PP & R scheme. For
over two decades, State Farm set monthly payment caps
and individually rewarded those insurance adjusters who
paid less than the market value for claims. Agents
changed the contents of files, lied to customers, and
committed other dishonest and fraudulent acts in order to
meet financial goals .......
.As the trial court found,
State Farm's fraudulent practices were consistently
directed to persons-poor racial or ethnic minorities,
women, and elderly individuals-who State Farm
believed would be less likely to object or take legal action.
Second, State Farm engaged in deliberate concealment
and destruction of all documents related to this profit
scheme.
State Farm's own witnesses testified that
documents were routinely destroyed so as to avoid their
potential disclosure through discovery requests. Such
destruction even occurred while this litigation was
pending. Additionally, State Farm, as a matter of policy,
keeps no corporate records related to lawsuits against it,
thus shielding itself from having to disclose information
related to the number and scope of bad faith actions in
which it has been involved.
Third, State Farm has systematically harassed and
intimidated
opposing
claimants,
witnesses,
and
attorneys.
For example, State Farm published an
instruction manual for its attorneys mandating them to
"ask personal questions" as part of the investigation and
examination of claimant in order to deter litigation ......
There was also evidence that State Farm actually

25. Campbell, 65 P.3d at 1141.
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instructs its attorneys and claim superintendents to
employ "mad dog defense tactics"-using the company's
large resources to "wear out" opposing attorneys by
prolonging litigation, making meritless objections,
claiming false privileges, destroying documents, and
abusing the law and motion process.26
There is little reason to suppose that State Farm is the worst
offender in the industry, or that other companies are not subject to
similar temptations. 27 The prevalence of bad faith actions against
28
insurance companies suggests the behavior is substantial.
Indeed, for these purposes first-party bad faith actions are
relevant as well; an insurance company that stonewalls its
policyholders is at least as likely to treat claimants against its
29
policyholders the same.
B.

Causes

The phenomenon of insurance company intransigence is hard
to explain using the traditional approaches to settlement. In cases
in which liability is relatively clear and damages are likely to be
very high, the approaches do not predict such opposition to
settlement. Traditional approaches predict instead that insurance
companies want to avoid the reputational and financial effects of
26. Id. at 1148 (citations omitted).
27. State Farm was under financial pressure because it experienced very
high underwriting losses during the period, which increased its need to
maximize float. Warren Buffett's annual letter to shareholders of Berkshire
Hathaway in 2000 reported that in 1999 State Farm's auto lines had

underwriting losses of 18%, compared to 4% at Berkshire's own Geico.

Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Annual Report, at 11 (2000), http://www.berkshire
hathaway.com/2000ar/2000ar.pdf.
28. There are entire treatises on insurance bad faith, see, e.g., STEPHEN F.
ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES (1997), and an active

Bad Faith Insurance Litigation Insurance Group of the American Association
of Justice (formerly Association of Trial Lawyers of America), see "AAJ
Litigation Groups, http://justice.orgllitgroups/index.aspx, last visited June
16, 2008
29. For examples of large scale programs by first-party insurers to delay
or deny claims, see RAY BOURHIS, INSULT TO INJURY: INSURANCE, FRAUD, AND
THE BIG BUSINESS OF BAD FAITH (2005); David Berardinelli, An Insurer in the

Grip of Greed, 43 TRIAL 7, July 2007, at 32.
As described below, insurance company executives have explained and
even celebrated the strategy of denying claims to retain accrued premiums
for as long as possible. See infra text and notes 35-41.
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very large verdicts, which are very likely to occur. Bad faith law
makes it more likely that they will have to pay beyond the policy
limits, an excess that could be avoided by early settlement. But
the models are inconsistent with the phenomenon of
intransigence, so further explanation is required. In fact, because
of three factors, intransigence is a rational strategy for insurance
companies to pursue. The factors that suggest that intransigence
is a rational strategy also provide indirect evidence for the
prevalence of the phenomenon; it is reasonable to assume that
insurance companies behave in ways that maximize their
profitability, and the factors explain why intransigence is profit
maximizing.
1. Lower risks. Intransigence is more attractive when the
risks of intransigence are lower. The success of tort reform
measures and the limits of bad faith law each reduces the risks to
an insurance company that unreasonably refuses to settle a case.
Consistent with the economic model of settlement, if the expected
value of litigation is lower, then the insurance company is subject
to less risk if it takes a case to trial.
In many states, statutes that have been enacted under the
banner of tort reform limit the victim's potential recovery, such as
a cap on noneconomic damages or the statutory or constitutional
limits on punitive damages. 30 These measures decrease the
expected value of the case and therefore the risk of trial for the
company. The greater the limitation on recovery is, the greater
the incentive to avoid settlement. In Indiana, for example, a hard
cap on total damages in medical malpractice cases removes
practically all incentive to settle many large cases; 3 1 the only
added expense of going to trial is the transaction costs, and there
have been reports that some insurance companies have even
limited these by negotiating low fees with the firms they
32
frequently retain.
In theory, a company has no incentive to gamble with the
30. See Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Conservative Campaign
To Roll Back the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 40-44 (2004).
31. IND. CODE§ 34-18-14-3 (1999).
32. The reports on Indiana are anecdotal accounts by plaintiffs' lawyers.
As a general matter, insurance companies purchase legal services wholesale
and are therefore able to negotiate for lower costs. In Kritzer's terms,
insurance defense has become a commodity. See Defending Torts, supra note
9, at 32-38; Commodification, supra note 9, at 2088-89.
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insured's money by refusing to settle within the policy limits
because the law of bad faith will require the company to pay the
excess judgment. In many jurisdictions, however, bad faith is not
fully effective in deterring the company because of the liability
standard applied and the uncertainty of its application. Courts
variously use negligence, bad faith, good faith, and interestbalancing rules to evaluate the company's conduct. 33 None of
these approaches imposes strict liability for rejecting a settlement
offer; each instead requires the court to exercise judgment about
the conduct, and there is always a degree of uncertainty about
that judgment. In particular, the more complex the underlying
case is, (large cases are typically complex), the less clear it will be
that the company has acted wrongfully. In a complex medical
malpractice case, for example, the facts could be sufficiently
complex and the need for judgment by the defendant physician
sufficiently nuanced that the company has room to argue about
the reasonableness of its failure to settle.
34
2. Float. Insurance companies have two sources of profit.
Underwriting profit results from taking in more money in
premiums than is paid out in claims and expenses. Investment
profit results from earning income on funds reserved for future
claims payouts. Investment profit is determined by two factors:
the rate of return on investments and "float"-the delay between
collecting premiums and paying claims. Even if an insurance
company ultimately has to pay a judgment, there is a financial
advantage to delaying the payment and capturing the time value
of the money. In recent years companies have paid greater
attention to the value of float and therefore have greater incentive
35
to delay or deny payment of large claims.
33. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 17, at 880-84. See also Kenneth
Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's Liability for Bad Faith, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1994) ("liability for bad faith is no longer quite the
dramatic threat to insurers-nor for most plaintiffs the potential pot of gold
at the end of the rainbow-that it may once have seemed to be").
34. See generally EMMETT VAUGHAN & THERESE VAUGHAN, ESSENTIALS OF
RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE ch. 7 (2001).
35. Richard E. Stewart & Barbara D. Stewart, The Loss of the Certainty
Effect, 4 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29, 32 (2001).Stewart and Stewart also point
out that the recent shift from "orientation toward policyholders to orientation
toward stockholders" contributes to the reluctance to pay out large claims.
Id. at 31.
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Warren Buffett has trumpeted utilizing float as a free source
of capital. In his most recent letter to the shareholders of
Berkshire Hathaway, the "oracle of Omaha" summed the concept
up succinctly: "float is money we hold that is not ours but which
we get to invest. ' 36 "An insurance business has value if its cost of
float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise
incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of
float is higher than market rates for money." 37
Berkshire Hathaway is certainly an unusual company
because of its preeminence, its size (its principal primary insurer
is GEICO, it also owns MedPro, a major medical malpractice
insurer, and it has two major reinsurance companies, General Re
and B-H Reinsurance), 38 and its management, but it provides a
useful example. At the end of 2006, Berkshire had float of $50.6
billion, and Buffett reported that over time, its cost of float was
likely to fall to less than zero; 39 that is, its insurance companies
had underwriting profits. This has been the case in about half of
the years it has been in the insurance business, even though in
40
the aggregate, most insurers operate at an underwriting loss.
Float is particularly attractive to companies whose cost of capital
is high or who (like Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway) have a high
rate of return on invested capital. It is even more attractive when,
as in most jurisdictions, there is either no requirement that the
company pay prejudgment interest on tort judgments, or the
interest rate is set at rates that more closely reflect short-term
41
interest rates than long-term capital rates.
3. Attack on trial lawyers. The strategy of intransigence may

involve both a short-term and a long-term attack on trial lawyers.
The short-term attack takes advantage of elements of the
bargaining theory of negotiation. Refusing to settle, delaying
36. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., to shareholders 7 (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.
berkshirehathaway.com/letters/20061tr.pdf.

37. Id.
38. See Berkshire Hathaway Inc. http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/
subs/sublinks.html.
39. Buffett, supra note 36.
40. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., to shareholders 6 (Feb. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.bershirehathaway.com/letters/20051tr.pdf.
41. See infra text and notes 79-84.
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settlement, or requiring litigation imposes tremendous costs on
trial lawyers. A large medical malpractice case, for example, can
frequently require an investment in costs and time of $200,000.42

Although there may be an expected return that theoretically is
commensurate with the cost and risk, as a practical matter most
plaintiffs' lawyers cannot manage their case portfolios to sustain
an investment in such cases, or certainly in many such cases (and
43
the means of financing the investment are very expensive, too).
Because of the expense as well as problems of expertise, the
supply of lawyers available to take such cases is relatively
inelastic. The result is to limit the supply of lawyers willing to
take such cases or pursue them aggressively, so cases are not
brought or are settled earlier and for lower amounts than they
might be otherwise.
The long-term attack extends the short-term attack. The
ability to sustain a firm that pursues large cases requires a
portfolio management strategy based on big wins in major cases
within a reasonable time and following a reasonable investment.
Over time, the true expected value of large cases declines. The
effect is to reduce the willingness and ability of lawyers to take
such cases, and eventually to drive lawyers out of this area of
practice.
There is an analogy here to other tort reform strategies.
Insurance companies and other corporate interests have invested
huge amounts in lobbying, public relations, and litigation around
issues such as demonizing trial lawyers, enacting damage caps,
and limiting punitive damages. 44 All of these activities impose
short-term costs on the companies for which they receive no
immediate benefit. In the long run, however, the strategies have
been enormously effective in not only achieving specific reforms
42. See Anthony J. Sebok, Dispatchesfrom the Tort Wars (Review Essay),
85 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1490-95 (2007) (noting the expenses involved in a large
torts case and arguing that plaintiffs' lawyers being paid on a contingency
basis generally have incentive to screen cases based on merit, since they bear
the costs if the plaintiff does not receive a favorable settlement); David A.
Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform:
It's the Incentives Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1117-20 (2006) (same).
43. On plaintiffs lawyers as portfolio managers, see HERBERT M. KRITZER,
RISK, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE

12-19 (2004).
See generally Feinman, supra note 30.

UNITED STATES

44.
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but in changing the economics of law practice for victims'
lawyers. 4 5 The most extreme example arises in jurisdictions such
as Texas in which the medical malpractice bar has been decimated
by severe reforms. 46 The same phenomenon may be at work here:
short-term costs (in added litigation expenses and perhaps even
judgments) for long-term benefits.
C.

Consequences

The phenomenon of insurance company intransigence distorts
normal settlement processes and undermines the objectives of the
tort system.
While insurance companies are strategically
intransigent, tort victims need funds to replace lost income and for
medical and other expenses, they are risk averse, and their
lawyers are subject to the uncertain economics of contingency fee
practice. Therefore, some cases settle for far below the expected
value of the case. Other cases go to judgment, and for many of
those there is under-compensation if, due to the limits of bad faith
law, the insurance company is not required to pay the excess
above the policy limit and is not liable for additional costs of delay
such as additional litigation costs. To the extent that there is
under-compensation, there is also inadequate deterrence. The
assumption of the system is that insurance costs are a rough
proxy for real costs, so the cost of insurance encourages a proper
degree of care. That does not happen if insurance costs are
reduced by intransigence. Fairness is to a large extent a function
of compensation and deterrence, so the system is less fair as well
to the extent that those objectives are underserved. In the long
term, to the extent that intransigence continues, tort objectives
will be increasingly undermined because of the damage done to
47
the victims' bar.
45. See id. at 12-19.
46. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 74.301, 74.401 (Vernon 2005).
See also Daniel Costello, Lacking Lawyers, Justice Is Denied, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
29, 2007 (decline of medical malpractice cases following enactment of damage
cap).

47.

Outside the tort system, insurance company intransigence has other

deleterious consequences. Insurance is not simply a private contract but also
plays an important public role. That role is undermined by intransigence.
There is a history in the insurance industry of insurer conduct that
undermines confidence in the insurance market and the system of insurance;
failure to pay clear claims promptly is another example of that phenomenon
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ATTACKING INSURANCE COMPANY INTRANSIGENCE: GENUINE TORT

REFORM

Insurance company intransigence is a likely candidate for
genuine tort reform, the subject of this Symposium, because it
threatens the vitality of the tort system. The objective of reform is
to increase the likelihood that large cases in which the liability
rules of tort law are violated are resolved in favor of the victim,
either by litigation or settlement, with damages that more fully
compensate the victim and therefore appropriately fix the cost of
wrongdoing. Because these are cases in which the defendant is
insured and the insurance company controls the litigation, the
insurance company has to act fairly in deciding to settle or litigate
or bear the cost of failing to do so. The response also has to
recognize the institutional factors at work, particularly the
insurance company's status as a repeat player with long-term,
strategic interests, the victim's need for timely and adequate
compensation, and the victim's lawyer's role as the funder of
litigation.
The following sections describe a variety of measures that
respond to the problem of insurance company intransigence.
Some of these are in place, in whole or part, in a few jurisdictions,
but none have been widely adopted.
Some would be best
implemented through legislation; others could be adopted by the
courts through extensions, modest or ambitious, of existing
doctrine.
A common feature of all of the proposals is that they are
focused on the particular issue of advancing the objectives of the
tort system by imposing liability for insurance company
intransigence. Law works through doctrine. Doctrine is often
general, but it is always applied, as here, in context. The
institution of insurance is generally understood to provide a
distinctive context for the application of general doctrines; issues
of contract interpretation or misrepresentation, for example, take
on a particular flavor when the insurance relationship is involved.
Insurance plays key roles in the tort system and it is accordingly
and, in the long run, erodes the role of insurance in society. For example,
incontestability clauses arose to remedy opportunistic behavior by insurance
companies that eroded public confidence in insurance. See Galanty v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 1 P.3d 658 (Cal. 2000).
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imbued with a public interest. Some of the doctrines discussed
here, such as insurance company bad faith, focus specifically on
the insurance context.
Other doctrines, such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress and wrongful litigation, are very
general. With respect to those doctrines, the expansion suggested
here is modest precisely because it is focused on the particular
problem of insurance company intransigence.
A. The Good Faith Duty Owed to the Insured
A starting point for analysis is the insurance company's duty
of good faith to its insured. This duty provides a baseline for
evaluating the insurance company's behavior, but it is not
adequate to address the problem of intransigence.
Liability insurance policies routinely empower the insurer to
settle claims against the insured, and the courts require that this
power be exercised with appropriate regard for the insured's
interest-that is, in good faith. 48 In cases in which the insurance
company commits bad faith and the failure to settle results in a
judgment in excess of the policy limits, the company is required to
pay the excess judgment. 49 The law of bad faith is complex,
involving, across the jurisdictions, different standards and
different factors that the courts look to in applying those
standards. 50 The variation and vagueness of many standards
often makes it difficult to establish bad faith because the company
can point to some vagueness or uncertainty in the facts of the
case. 5 1 In part for this reason, commentators have considered
whether companies should be strictly liable for excess judgments
in cases in which they rejected settlement offers. 5 2 Two courts

48. See ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 897 (2002);
KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 17.
49. JERRY, supra note 48, at 898-908; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 17, at
897.
50. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 17, at 880-87.
51. More than a decade ago, Kenneth Abraham concluded that "liability
for bad faith is no longer quite the dramatic threat to insurers-nor for most
plaintiffs the potential pot of gold at the end of the rainbow-that it may once

have seemed to be" and "the probability of substantial doctrinal expansion in
this field is low." Kenneth Abraham, The Natural History of the Insurer's
Liability for Bad Faith,72 TEX. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (1994).
52. See JERRY, supranote 48, at 901-03; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 17,
at 886-89.
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53
have approached strict liability, but there does not seem to be a
54
trend in that direction.
The duty to settle in good faith benefits the victim in that it
provides funds to satisfy the judgment that otherwise would not
be available, because the defendant might not be pursued for the
excess or because the defendant is judgment proof. In many cases
the insured defendant assigns its bad faith claim to the victim, in
exchange for the victim agreeing not to pursue the defendant for
55
But assignment is not
any amount above the policy limits.
adequate to redress the victim's injury caused by company
intransigence, because the victim's action against the company
must await the conclusion of the litigation and, more importantly,
is a limited right. Even under a strengthened bad faith standard,
because the victim takes the right by assignment, the victim
stands in the shoes of the insured and is entitled to recover only
for the insured's losses, and sometimes not even to that extent;
some jurisdictions limit the victim's recovery to the amount of the
excess, excluding other damages suffered by the insured such as
emotional distress. 56 This does not solve the problems of delay,
under-compensation, and under-deterrence.

B. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Acts
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners has
adopted a Model Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act, some
57
version of which has been enacted in nearly every jurisdiction.
53. See Asermely v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 461, 464 (R.I. 1994);

Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766 (W. Va. 1990).
54. JERRY, supra note 48, at 902-03; KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 17, at
887.
55. V. Woerner, Annotation, Assignability of Insured's Right To Recover
over Against Liability Insurer for Rejection of Settlement Offer, 12 A.L.R.3d
1158 (1967).
56. See, e.g., Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye House, Inc., 137 P.3d 192,
196-97 (Cal. 2006); Bennion v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001); O.K. Lumber Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 523
(Alaska 1988). Some jurisdictions do not require an actual assignment but
See, e.g., Reko v. Creative
permit assignment by operation of law.
Promotions, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1005-06 (D. Minn. 1999); Kooyman v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Iowa 1982); Thompson v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y., 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971).
57. See generally Steven Plitt & Christie L. Kriegsfield, The Punitive
Damages Lottery Chase Is Over: Is There a Regulatory Alternative to the Tort
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The acts include a long list of actions prohibited to insurance
companies in resolving claims.
Particularly relevant are
provisions that state it is a violation for a company to:
fail to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the
prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance
58
policies;
not attempt in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and
equitable settlement of claims submitted in which
liability has become reasonably clear; 59

compel insureds or beneficiaries to institute suits to
recover amounts due under its policies by offering
substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
60
in suits brought by them;
make known to insureds or claimants a policy of
appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or
claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept
settlements or compromises less than the amount
61
awarded in arbitration.
In addition to specific variations in the language of enacted
statutes, there are two general variations.
The first variation turns on whether a single act constitutes a
violation. The great majority of statutes include the requirement
that prohibited acts constitute a violation if committed "with such
frequency as to indicate a general business practice" or similar
language. 6 2 The other statutes find a single act to be a violation. 63
of Common Law Bad Faith and Does It Provide an Alternative Deterrent?, 37
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1221 (2005). For an attempt to develop a more collaborative
approach to claims practices, see Corry Van Zeeland et al., A Code of Conduct
for Negotiating Personal Injury Claims: Structuring the Shadow of Tort Law
(Tilburg U. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 1, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=976371.
58. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4C (2007).
59. Id. § 4E.
60. Id. § 4D.
61. This provision is not included in the Model Act but is included in
many state enactments. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:29B-4(9)(k) (West 2001).
62. MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 3B (2007). A
variation prohibits violating the statute "flagrantly and in conscious
disregard" of the law. Plitt & Kriegsfield, supra note 57, at 1248-49.
63. Plitt & Kriegsfield, supranote 57, at 1249-50.
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In dealing with the problem of insurance company intransigence,
each type of provision has its advantages. If only a single act is
required, the proof is simpler in that the violation in a particular
case is sufficient. But under the business practice rule, discovery
should be available to victims' lawyers to establish whether the
violation shown in the individual case is unique or is part of a
general business practice. From a policy perspective, that gives
broader range to the possibility of discovering and remedying
abuse. From the victim's perspective, the company's likely desire
to avoid discovery on that issue creates greater pressure for the
company to settle the case.
The second variation concerns whether the statutes covers
"insureds" (for present purposes, defendants in tort litigation) or
"insureds and claimants" (defendants and victims). If a court
were to imply a private right of action based on the statute,
whether plaintiffs were within the scope of the statutory language
would be significant. In fact, relatively few jurisdictions allow
anyone, insured or victim, to bring a private claim under the
Most jurisdictions require the insured to pursue
statute. 64
administrative remedies. 65 Only a very few statutes specifically
allow an action by the victim, 6 6 and only a few more jurisdictions
reach the same result by judicial implication of a private right of
67
actions.
Even though jurisdictions generally do not allow private
actions, they do provide for administrative enforcement through a
system of penalties by the insurance commissioner or other
official. Under the Model Act and many statutes, there is a twotiered system of penalties, with higher penalties for knowing
violations, and, remarkably, a cap on aggregate penalties within a
specified period. 68 Some of the penalties are modest. Connecticut,
for example, has a penalty of $1,000 per violation and $10,000 in
the aggregate per six-month period for tier one and $5,000

64. Id. at 1268-84.
65. Id. at 1269.
66.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 624.155(1) (2004); N.M. STAT. § 59A-16-30

(2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-242 (2005).

67. Clegg v. Butler, 676 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Mass. 1997); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky. 1988).
68. Model Unfair CLAIMs SETTLEMENT PRACTICEs ACT § 6 (2007).
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per/$50,000 aggregate for tier two violations. 6 9 Others are more
dramatic.; Illinois has a penalty up to $250,000 for a single
violation with no aggregate cap. 70 In addition to monetary
penalties, the statutes provide the theoretical possibility of
revocation on a company's permission to do business in a state,
although such a sanction is hard to imagine. 71
There is seldom adequate reporting of enforcement
proceedings, 72 so it is hard to know if these measures are effective.
Looking at what reports are available, it seems sanctions tend
toward the modest side. 73
This is likely not because the
companies do not engage in such behavior, but because insureds,
victims, and their lawyers typically do not report such behavior
and the regulators do not aggressively enforce the statutes.
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-817 (1958).
70. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/154.8 (1993).
71. See Plitt & Kriegsfield, supra note 57, at 1260-61. An example of a
statute providing for revocation of permission is NEV. REV. STAT. § 686A.187
(2003).
72. Some states require companies to maintain records of complaints.
See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 4724(10) (2007). Other states require that the
complaints be reported and available for use in litigation. See, e.g., N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 417:4-XV(b) (2004).Evidence as to numbers and types of
complaints to the insurance department against an insurer, and said
department's complaint experience with other insurers writing similar lines
of insurance, shall be admissible in evidence in an administrative or judicial
proceeding brought under this title, provided that no insurer shall be deemed
in violation of this section solely by reason of the numbers and types of such
complaints.
OR. REV. STAT. § 746.230 (2005).

(2) No insurer shall refuse, without just cause, to pay or settle claims
arising under coverages provided by its policies with such frequency
as to indicate a general business practice in this state, which general
business practice is evidenced by:
(a) A substantial increase in the number of complaints against the
insurer received by the Department of Consumer and Business
Services;
(b) A substantial increase in the number of lawsuits filed against the
insurer or its insureds by claimants; or
(c) Other relevant evidence.
73. Not all states make enforcement orders easily available, but those
that do suggest the scale of the penalties. See, e.g., Kansas Insurance
Commissioner (2007), http://www.ksinsurance.org/legallorders.php?year=
2007, orders re: American Family Mutual Insurance Company (penalties of
$500 and $1,000) and American National Property and Casualty Company
(penalty of $4,000).
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The most important reform concerning these statutes would
be to provide a private right of action to the tort victim who is
injured by unfair claims settlement practices. That cause of
action would serve the statutory purpose by providing a remedy
for the one who is actually harmed by the practices-in cases of
intransigence, the plaintiff-victim, not the defendant-insuredand by providing a substantial disincentive for companies to
engage in the practices. The remedy would be the damages
suffered by the plaintiff, which would include not only the excess
judgment over the policy limit but also consequential economic
losses, damages for emotional distress, and attorneys fees and the
other costs of establishing the claim.
If enforcement of the statutes remains primarily regulatory,
those statutes that provide only modest sanctions should be
strengthened with realistic penalties. More important is the need
to enforce statutes already on the books. No new law is required
for victims' attorneys to report routinely insurance bad faith and
to press regulators to enforce more aggressively the statutes.
Anecdotal evidence supports that the possibility of reporting
provides considerable leverage to victims in settlement
On the regulators' side, as a historical matter
negotiations.
generally have been more passive in
commissioners
insurance
regulating than have attorneys general. The model of Eliot
Spitzer-an attorney general who is both interested in remedying
bad insurance behavior and other injuries to consumers and who
74
inspire other regulators and
is politically ambitious -may
companies.
increase the stakes for insurance
C.

A Common Law Action for Bad Faith to the Victim

In the absence of statutory reform, the courts could create a
common law cause of action, enforceable by the victim, for
75
As the courts
insurance company bad faith refusal to settle.
74. As Attorney General of New York, Spitzer pursued insurance brokers
for bid rigging and kickbacks. See, e.g., Joseph B. Treaster, InsuranceBroker
Settles Spitzer Suit for $850 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at Al.

Campaigning in part on the basis of his record as a reformer, Spitzer was
elected governor in November 2006.
75.

The leading article is Francis J. Mootz III, The Sounds of Silence:

Waiting for Courts To Acknowledge that Public Policy Justifies Awarding
Damages to Third-Party Claimants when Liability Insurers Deal with Them
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often recognize, insurance is a dependent relationship, heavily
regulated, and imbued with the public interest. Beyond the
parties to the insurance contract, the insurance system provides
for the redistribution of funds from pooled premiums to injured
persons. This is especially true for situations of mandatory
insurance, such as auto insurance, but it is true of all liability
coverage.
The public has an interest in fair and efficient
settlement. Because of regulatory inadequacies, there is no means
of effectuating this interest other than through a private right of
action.
The standard for bad faith needs to be fleshed out in the
cases. Some suggestions from the literature and cases:
"use of specious and pretextual arguments to
avoid
76
settlement"
"use of delay in payment to exert pressure to get
a third
party to accept less than it could reasonably expect" 77
failure to settle "when the insured's liability is reasonably
clear and the claimants' damages are reasonably
ascertainable and which they have contracted to cover."' 78
The damages in this action would flow from its nature as a
tort action: all loss proximately caused by the wrongful conduct.
In a case in which the victim was required to settle early and for
less than the full damages, part of the recovery is the difference
between the amount that was received in settlement and the full
damages that the case was worth. In every case, the loss includes
the attorneys fees and other costs due to the bad faith, emotional
distress damages, and, in a proper case (of which there may be
many), punitive damages.

in Bad Faith, 2 NEV. L.J. 443 (2002). There have been a few judicial
opinions-dissents and concurrences-that show the way. See Krupnick v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Ct. App. 1994) (Timlin,
J., dissenting); Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 271
(Wis. 1981) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
76. Mootz, supra note 75, at 485.
77. Id.
78. Krupnick, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 65.
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D. Prejudgment Interest and Offer of Judgment Rules
The insurance company that is required to pay a judgment is,
in most jurisdictions, subject to the disincentive for delay of being
required to pay prejudgment interest in addition to the amount of
the judgment itself. Traditionally prejudgment interest was not
awarded on unliquidated claims, such as tort claims, the amount
of which could not be computed before trial. The rationale was
protective of defendants; the defendant could not reasonably be
expected to satisfy an obligation the amount of which was
79
uncertain and in dispute.
Over time courts and legislatures recognized that failing to
award prejudgment interest constitutes a loss to the plaintiff and
a benefit to the defendant, as the defendant has the use of the
plaintiffs funds interest-free until the time of payment. In
response, jurisdictions have either vested discretion in court or
jury to award prejudgment interest or established the award of
interest as a matter of right.8 0 In most jurisdictions, therefore,
the extent to which prejudgment interest provides a disincentive
for insurance company intransigence is not the allowance of
prejudgment interest, but the rate at which it is assessed. The
rates vary among the jurisdictions, but a significant effort by the
American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) to limit the effect of
prejudgment interest has resulted in relatively low rates of
interest. ATRA proposed that the interest rate be set at the U.S.
Treasury bill rate at the time the action was filed,8 1 and many
jurisdictions have responded by setting the rate at approximately
82
that rate.
The availability of prejudgment interest at rates that
approximate short-term funds rates does not provide much of a

79. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 165 (1973).
80. See Erich H. Gaston, When Prejudgment Interest Statutes and
Insurance Policy Language Collide: Should Freedom of Contract Trump
Legislative Intent?, 20 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 359 (2001); Anthony E. Rothschild,
Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U. L. REV.
192 (1982).
81. AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
2
REFORM, http://www.atra.org/issues/indexphpissue?=749 .
82. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336:1 (2006) (twenty-six week

Treasury bill rate plus 2%).
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disincentive to intransigence. 8 3 The relevant time period is
between the time of offer and the time of conclusion of litigation,
which, given the delays common in litigation, is likely to be
several years rather than several months. Indeed, even when an
individual case is concluded within a relatively short time period,
because the insurance company maintains a continuing portfolio
of cases, the funds not paid out to tort victims-the float-is really
a long-term source of capital for the company.
Making
prejudgment interest mandatory and increasing the interest rate
substantially rate would provide more of a disincentive. A few
states have a rate on tort claims as high as 12%,8 4 but there is no
empirical evidence that even that rate deters intransigence.
A related potential reform is expanding offer of judgment
rules. The most common rule, in effect in the federal system and
more than half the states, has two defects.8 5 That rule is a oneway rule; a defendant but not a plaintiff may make an offer of
judgment with adverse consequences for the other party who fails

to do appreciably better in court. 86 The adverse consequences are
modest; the party is responsible for court costs but not attorneys
87
fees or other costs of the party extending the offer.
A number of states link offer of judgment and prejudgment

interest by altering the prejudgment interest rate on offers that
are rejected to the disadvantage of an offeree who obtains a less
favorable judgment.8 8 A few states, such as Alaska and New
Jersey, have bilateral offer of judgment rules. 8 9 In theory these

rules should be effective in reducing intransigence because it

83. In Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group, 718 P.2d 77 (Cal. 1986), the
plaintiffs asserted that by filing a frivolous appeal, the defendant's insurance
company could "capitalize during the pendency of the appeal on the
significant differential between the statutory rate of interest (7%) and the
general market rate (15%)." Id. at 79.
84. E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 6B (1958); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
41a (1959).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 68; Michael E. Solimine & Bryan Pacheco, State Court
Regulation of Offers of Judgment and Its Lessons for Federal Practice, 13
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 51, 64-65 (1997).
86. Solimine & Pacheco, supra note 85, at 64.
87. Id.
88. Id.; KEVIN E. MCCARTHY, INTEREST ON OFFERS OF JUDGMENT, OLR
RESEARCH REPORT (Nov. 14, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ins
/rpt/2003-R-0832.htm.
89. See McCARTHY, supra note 88.
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increases the cost of that strategy; a company that refuses a
reasonable settlement offer increases the expected value of its
ultimate loss, because it will be liable for the victim's excess
attorney fees due to its unreasonableness. 90
The empirical
evidence is mixed, however. A study of the Alaska rule reported
mixed effects of the rule in a minority of cases, and then more
often in contract than tort cases, putting pressure on defendants
in substantial cases in which liability was clear, but the effect was
greatest on parties of moderate means; the study did not account
for insurance companies as major actors. 91 A study of New
Jersey's rule found the rule had little effect on the size of damage
awards but did reduce the duration of litigation and therefore
attorney fees. 92 Further experimentation with substantial offer of
judgment rules may be worthwhile to ascertain their effect in
punishing intransigence.
E.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

An insurance company's refusal to settle a case in which
liability is clear and damages are large and certain is egregious
behavior.
Accompanied by special circumstances such as an
injured, destitute victim in immediate need of funds or extreme
behavior such as using the discovery process to embarrass and
oppress as in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell93 is outrageous.
In that sense, there is a wellestablished tort directed at that type of conduct: the tort of
outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Although the rule at common law through the early twentieth
century barred recovery for emotional harm in the absence of

90. Attorneys take all these cases on a contingency fee basis, but
attorneys fees can be calculated by various methods as they are in other cases
in which attorneys fees are statutorily provided for, such as consumer fraud
or civil rights cases.
91. Susanne Di Pietro, The English Rule at Work in Alaska, 80
JUDICATURE 88 (1996) [hereinafter Rule at Work]; Susanne Di Pietro &
Teresa W. Carns, Alaska's English Rule: Attorney's Fee Shifting in Civil
Cases, 13 ALASKA L. REV. 33 (1996) [hereinafter Alaska's English Rule].
92. Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil
Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the
East, 59 VAND. L. REV. 155 (2006).
93. 538 U.S. 408, 431-36 (2003).
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physical injury, 94 courts recognized exceptions for particularly
egregious acts, such as practical jokes gone bad or extraordinary

meanness, and, more importantly, for entities such as common
carriers, innkeepers, and telegraph companies that had a
heightened responsibility toward their customers. 95

The first

Restatement of Torts, published in 1934, did not recognize the
tort, 96 but the Supplement published in 1948 added the tort for
"unprivileged" conduct. 97 Today intentional infliction of emotional
distress is widely adopted by courts, often using the formulation of
the Restatement Second of Torts:
§ 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional
Distress

(1) One who by extreme

and outrageous

conduct

intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such

emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results
from it, for such bodily harm.
The elements of the tort therefore include:
(1) The defendant acts intentionally or recklessly;
(2) The defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous;
(3) The defendant's conduct is the cause of the plaintiffs
emotional distress;
98
(4) The plaintiffs emotional distress is severe.

These elements can be analyzed separately. For example, the
first element can be satisfied where the defendant intends to

inflict severe emotional distress, is certain that severe emotional
distress will result from its conduct, is substantially certain that

severe

emotional

distress will result (all subsumed

under

"intentionally"), or where the defendant deliberately disregards a
94.

DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 824 (2001).

95. See id.; Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and
the Limits of Evenhandedness:Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by
Outrageous Conduct, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982).
96. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934).

97.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

98. RESTATEMENT

§ 46 (Supp. 1948).

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
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high degree of probably that emotional distress will follow from its
99
conduct (recklessness).
To a considerable extent, however, the tort focuses on the
singular element of outrageousness. 0 0 Intention to cause distress
through conduct that is not outrageous is not actionable, while
outrageous conduct presumes intention or recklessness. 10 1
Outrageousness also validates the severity of the emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, the key question for
insurance cases is what type of conduct by an insurance company
is sufficiently outrageous to be actionable.
The Restatement and the case law suggest the limitations and
the possibilities of application of the tort to the insurance context.
The Restatement's general position, 10 2 mirrored by the courts, is
narrow.
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against
10 3
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"'
And as applied to disputes about tort litigation, there is a
further problem:
The conduct, although it would otherwise be extreme and
outrageous, may be privileged under the circumstances.
The actor is never liable, for example, where he has done

99. Id. § 46, cmt. i.
100. See Givelber, supra note 95, at 46-51.
101. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 826; Givelber, supra note 95, at 46-47.
102. When the Restatement was published in 1965 its authors included a
qualification about the development of the law:
The law is still in a stage of development, and the ultimate limits of
this tort are not yet determined. This Section states the extent of
the liability thus far accepted generally by the courts. The Caveat is
intended to leave fully open the possibility of further development of
the law, and the recognition of other situations in which liability
may be imposed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. c (1965).
The case law since then has been substantial, but in significant respects
it still reflects the Restatement view.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d.
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no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a
permissible way, even though he is well aware that such
104
insistence is certain to cause emotional distress.
On the other hand, the Restatement recognizes the
significance of the defendant's actual or potential power or
authority over the victim:
The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct
may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a
relation with the other, which gives him actual or
apparent authority over the other, or power to affect his
10 5
interests.
The illustrations to this point include a private detective
posing as a police officer, 10 6 a school principal exercising authority
over a student, 10 7 and the classical case of a creditor abusing a
debtor.

108

Intentional infliction has often been alleged in insurance
cases as an alternative or additional remedy to violation of an
unfair claims settlement practices act or a common law bad faith
action. 10 9 In fact, the tort played a significant role in the early
development of the bad faith action. In Fletcher v. Western
National Life Insurance Co., 1 10 the California court upheld an
emotional distress claim against a disability insurer, allowing
recovery including punitive damages for a tort action arising out
of the contractual relationship between insurer and insured. 1 11
The company ignored the consensus of medical reports concerning
of
an
allegation
fabricated
insured's
disability,
the
misrepresentation against the insured, ceased payments that it
knew to be due, and attempted to coerce the insured into a
settlement by taking advantage of his precarious financial
condition. 112 Ultimately the company conceded that its conduct
104. Id. § 46 cmt. g.
105. Id. § 46 cmt. e.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Gregory G. Sarno, Liability of Insurer, or Insurance Agent or
Adjuster, for Infliction of Emotional Distress,6 A.L.R.5th 297 (1992).
110. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
111. Id. at 93.
112. Id. at 83-87.
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had been outrageous but argued that the evidence of its behavior
was privileged as communication between adverse contracting
parties attempting to settle a dispute. 113 The court recognized
that privilege was possible but held it did not extend to the
1 14
assertion of rights in an outrageous manner.
In recognizing the availability of the action for outrage, the
Fletcher court focused on the relationship between the parties
which, though contractual in origin, could give rise to tort duties:
In determining whether liability should be imposed for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the cases and
commentators have emphasized the significance of the
relationship between the parties in determining whether liability
should be imposed. Additionally, the special obligation of public
utilities and other enterprises affected with the public interest has
been noted as significant in the imposition of liability upon such
defendants even in the absence of outrageous conduct, apparently
upon a policy basis of encouraging fair treatment of the public
whom the enterprises serve. Both of these considerations are
pertinent to the case at bench. The insurance business is
governmentally regulated to a substantial degree. It is affected
with a public interest and offers services of a quasi-public nature.
An insurer has a special relationship to its insured and has special
implied-in-law duties toward the insured. To some extent this
special relationship and these special duties take cognizance of the
great disparity in the economic situations and bargaining abilities
of the insurer and the insured.115
The emphasis on the special relationship between insurer and
insured means that the great majority of cases are first-party
insurance cases, and even then often not successful. Liability
insurance cases are rare because the insurance company and the
plaintiff are adverse parties, and courts generally conclude that
the absence of the kind of protective relationship evident in firstparty cases or the older common carrier cases makes outrage
116
harder to come by. Cluff v. Farmers Insurance Exchange,

113. Id. at 89.
114. Id. at 89-90; see also Doctor's Co. Ins. Servs. v. Superior Court, 275
Cal. Rptr. 674 (Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
115. Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
116. 460 P.2d 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969).
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decided contemporaneously with Fletcher, is instructive. 117 After
the death of her minor son, Cluff was "threatened and cajoled" by
the tortfeasor's insurance company to accept a settlement, telling
118
her that if she hired an attorney she would recover nothing.
Despite the threats she hired an attorney who advised the
company to cease all contact with Cluff except through the
attorney."19
Nevertheless, the company's representative
continued to contact her, telling her "he hated the fact" that she
had hired a lawyer, that her lawyer would not win the case, that
the most she would get was what the company was offering
whereas she might get nothing at all by taking the matter into
court; and that if she changed her mind about being represented
by counsel to have the attorney send them a letter to that effect
after which the insurance company would get the money to her
120
"because she probably needed it.'
Arizona had adopted the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, using Restatement Second §46, but the tort did
not extend to the facts in this case. 12 1 The court distinguished
cases like this one, in which the insurance adjuster contacted the
plaintiff, even knowing that she was represented by counsel, in a
possibly aggressive attempt to settle the case, from those in which
the adjuster committed further "aggravated acts." It pointed to the
contrast between the facts there and those in Interstate Life &
Accident Co. v. Brewer,12 2 for example, (a first-party case,
incidentally), in which the insurance adjuster contacted the
plaintiff while she was in bed recovering from a heart attack,
advised her that his company was cutting her payments, threw a
handful of coins in her face, and yelled at her "You don't need a
doctor, you ought to die!" 123

In the absence of such aggravated

conduct, no cause of action would lie, because "[t]he course of
human conduct even in our 'civilized' community has amply shown
that self seeking and inconsideration are a common trait in man's
relationship with man. The law does not purport to protect

117.

Id.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 667.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 668-69.
193 S.E. 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937).
Id. at 459-60.
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individuals from the minor manifestations of this human
24
conduct."1
Cluff illustrates the difficulties in applying the tort of outrage
to insurance company intransigence, and Fletcherits possibilities.
Courts that require specific acts of aggravated conduct will not
find the action available to the general problem of intransigence.
Even in those jurisdictions, it should still apply in many cases
because the intransigence is often accompanied by particular acts
such as threats or oppressive discovery. The more general
problem is the extent to which the action is available in thirdparty cases.
Fletcher and many other cases recognize the
uniqueness of the insurance context, but focus on the protective
125
role of insurer toward insured.
Outrage is, like negligence, an open-ended tort, applying a
general standard to an infinite variety of particular situations.
Like negligence, it is made more determinate as it is repeatedly
applied in similar contexts. Some of the outrage cases are
singular, particular in the early days of the tort's development,
such as the unfunny practical jokes. 126 But increasingly the tort
has been applied in a few relational contexts, such as employeremployee, creditor-debtor, and insurer-insured. 12 7 As Givelber
notes, these cases "essentially require a minimum fair procedure
in dealings between people who occupy unequal bargaining
positions and are bound (or apparently bound) by voluntary
agreements."' 128 As courts and legislatures increasingly have
recognized that liability insurance companies owe duties to the
victims of their insureds' actions, the tort can be used to establish
"minimum fair procedure" in that context as well.
F. Wrongful Litigation
Conventionally there are two torts for wrongfully using civil
litigation: (1) malicious prosecution or use of process, 129 and (2)

124. Cluff, 460 P.2d at 669.
125. See Fletcher,89 Cal. Rptr. 78.
126. The classic case is Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57, now
illustration 1 to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
127. Givelber, supranote 95, at 62-69; Sarno, supra note 109.
128.
129.

Givelber, supranote 95, at 68.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977).
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abuse of process. 130 Although these torts have seldom been
applied to defensive action, they represent a particularly fruitful
source of doctrinal development in remedying insurance company
intransigence.
The defendants in the wrongful litigation action can be either
or both of the insurance company and the counsel it retains on
behalf of its insured. 13 1 The attorney who misuses the civil
litigation process is obviously liable. 13 2 The insurance company
that directs the attorney to do so also is liable. 133 As a practical
matter, in most cases, the attorney does not exercise wholly
independent judgment about the conduct of the litigation; instead,
the company sets the parameters for defense and authorizes or
Although the
fails to authorize settlement negotiations. 134
defendant insured is the nominal party, because it typically has no
control over the litigation, it should not be liable for malicious
defense.

13 5

Malicious civil prosecution is traditionally directed at
wrongfully initiating or continuing an action. 13 6 The elements of
the cause of action are:
(1) The original action complained of was brought without
probable cause;
(2) It was actuated by malice;
(3) It was terminated favorably to plaintiff;
and (in some jurisdictions)
137
(4) The plaintiff suffered special injury.

Abuse of process is traditionally directed at misusing some

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. § 682.
Id. § 674.
Id. § 674 cmt. d.
Id. § 674 cmt. b.
Defending Torts, supranote 9, at 20-21.
See Givens v. Mulliken, 75 S.W.3d 383, 395-96 (Tenn. 2002) (company

liable when it "directed, commanded, or knowingly authorized" attorney's
actions.)
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 cmts. a-c (1979).
137. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 1228-29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
674.
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legal procedure for a purpose for which it was not intended.'
The elements of the tort are:
(1) The defendant had a purpose to use civil or criminal
process in way for which it was not designed (i.e.,
maliciously); and

38

1 39
(2) There was actual improper use of process.
Abuse of process traditionally served to provide a remedy
140
where the requirements of malicious prosecution are not met.
As can be seen from the statements of the elements, they share a
core principle of imposing liability for improper use of the legal
14 1
process. The law is variable across the jurisdictions and in flux,
but as the core has become emphasized and the particular
requirements deemphasized, some courts have merged the two
into a single tort of using litigation for an improper purpose-that
is, for a purpose other than the resolution of disputes and the
establishment of legal rights. 14 2 With a few exceptions, courts
have not recognized a cause of action for defensive action, either in
general under malicious prosecution or for abuse of process by
particular defensive tactics.1 4 3 Applying the wrongful litigation
torts to defensive action by insurance companies can involve
either developing each of the torts separately, or applying the
use of civil litigation; this section
merged tort of improper
144
considers each in turn.

138.
682.
139.
140.

DOBBS,

supra note 94, at 1234;

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
DOBBS, supra note 94, at 1235.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

§ 682 cmt. a.

141. Id. at 1236.
142. The leading case is DeVaney v. Thriftway Marketing Corp., 953 P.2d
277 (N.M. 1997).
143. The principal exceptions are Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882
(Ariz. App. 2004) and Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023 (N.H. 1995). See
Francis J. Mootz III, Holding Liability Insurers Accountable for Bad Faith
Litigation Tactics with the Tort of Abuse of Process, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 467
(2002/2003).
South Dakota has a singular statute that defines barratry as "the
assertion of a frivolous or malicious claim or defense or the filing of any
document with malice or in bad faith," but it has not been used in this
context. S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 20-9-6.1 (2007).
144. For the defense lawyers' critique of applying the wrongful litigation
torts to insurance company behavior, see William T. Barker et al., Litigating
about Litigation: Can Insurers Be Liable for Too Vigorously Defending Their
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1. Wrongful defense. The basis for a tort of wrongful defense
is that the harm of delaying litigation, engaging in excessive
discovery, multiplying the victim's costs, and otherwise employing
strategies unrelated to the fair resolution of disputes impose as
much harm on the victim as bringing a wrongful suit does on the
defendant in a classic malicious use of process case. 14 5 The
reasons for applying the tort sparingly are sound, but they are
inapplicable to the situation of tort litigation, where a repeat
player faces a one-shotter and the repeat player has much
incentive to engage in wrongful litigation. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,14 6 summarized earlier, is
an example of a clear case of liability with substantial damages
brought to trial in the absence of reasonable decisions about the
individual case in furtherance of a general plan for improper case
147
management.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in adopting the tort of
malicious defense, outlined elements of the cause of action in a
way that parallels those for malicious prosecution:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation,
or procurement of the defense of a civil proceeding is subject to
liability for all harm proximately caused, including reasonable
attorneys' fees, if
(a) he or she acts without probable cause, i.e., without any
credible basis in fact and such action is not warranted by
existing law or established equitable principles or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law,
(b) with knowledge or notice of the lack of merit in such
actions,
(c) primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the
proper adjudication of the claim and defense thereto, such
Insureds?, 42

TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 827 (2007). The authors were
counsel for Allstate in Crackel v. Allstate Insurance Co., 92 P.3d 882 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2004).
145. See Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of

Advocacy: A Proposalfor the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 891, 926 (1984).
146. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
147. Id.

2008]

INSURANCE COMPANY INTRANSIGENCE

223

as to harass, annoy or injure, or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,
(d) the previous proceedings are terminated in favor of
the party bringing the malicious defense action, and
(e) injury or damage is sustained.148
The first element of the tort of malicious prosecution is that
the original action complained of was brought without probable
cause. In an action based on malicious defense, the first obstacle
is that the action was not initiated by the defendant. Although
there are not a large number of cases addressing the issue, this
has been the principal obstacle to an action for malicious defense.
Supreme Court opined in Eastin v. Bank of
As the California
14 9
Stockton,
The plaintiff sets the law in motion; if he does so groundlessly
and maliciously, he is the cause of the defendant's damage. But
the defendant stands only on his legal rights-the plaintiff having
taken his case to court, the defendant has the privilege of calling
or jury, and he
upon him to prove it to the satisfaction of the judge
150
is guilty of no wrong in exercising this privilege.
Because the other elements of the cause of action can be
applied with little alteration from the case of malicious
prosecution to the case of malicious defense, this is the crux of the
issue. The harm that a plaintiff suffers from malicious defense
can be attributed as much to its own conduct in initiating the
litigation as to any wrongful action of the defendant. Unlike the
defendant who has been wrongfully haled into court by a
malicious plaintiff, the plaintiff is to blame for its own situation.
This position is incorrect. The harm suffered by the plaintiff
suffered by the defendant. As the court
is similar to the harm
15 1
noted in Aranson:
148. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1028-29 (citing Jonathan K. Van Patten &
Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of
Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 933-34 (1984)).
The injury requirement was not intended to require "special injury."
149.
150.

4 P. 1106 (Cal. 1884).
Id. at 1109-10. See also Ritter v. Ritter, 46 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ill. 1943);

151.

671 A.2d 1023.

Alan R. Gilbert, Annotation, May Action for Malicious Prosecution Be
Predicatedon Defense or Counterclaim in Civil Suit, 65 A.L.R.3d 901 (1975).
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[A]nyone who has been a litigant knows that the fact of
litigation has a profound effect upon the quality of one's
life that goes far beyond the mere entitlement to counsel
fees. Litigation is a disturbing influence to one degree or
another. The litigant may have the benefit of skilled and
conscientious counsel as well as a strong and wellfounded case on the facts, but until such time as the
favorable verdict is in hand beyond the reach of appeal,
there is a day-to-day uncertainty of the outcome. One
wonders about the availability of witnesses at the
appropriate times and whether their information will be
adequately imparted.
One may have gnawing
uncertainty about the myriad things that can go wrong in
a lawsuit. Here, although the plaintiffs prevailed in their
lawsuit, they did so at a price-in time, money, and
uncertainty.

152

In this class of cases it is only true in a formal, perhaps
formalistic, sense to say that the plaintiff initiated the litigation.
Once again, the context is crucial. It is not necessary to argue
that a tort of malicious defense should be available in every case
to conclude that it ought to be available as a response to insurance
company intransigence. The insurance company as a repeat
player faces a one-shotter plaintiff whose only means of recovering
in a case in which liability and damages are reasonably clear is to
initiate litigation. It is meaningful to conclude that the insurance
company's stonewalling, not the plaintiffs assertion of its rightful
claim, is the cause of the litigation. Moreover, the sole issue is not
the commencement of the litigation but its conduct; when the
insurance company protracts the litigation without probable cause
and for an improper purpose, it unfairly visits harm on the
plaintiff and perverts the objectives of the system. In this way,
the malicious defense action overlaps the action for abuse of
process discussed below.
The action must be defended without probable cause, which
the Restatement (Second) of Torts states occurs when one:
[R]easonably believes in the existence of the facts upon
which the claim is based, and either

152. Id. at 1028.
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(a) correctly or reasonably believes that under those facts
the claim may be valid under the applicable law, or
(b) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice of
counsel, sought in good faith and given after full
disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge and
information.153
This standard is both subjective and objective: the company
must actually believe it has a valid defense and the belief must be
154
reasonable.
Applying this standard, evidence of the existence of probable
cause arises where the insurance company or its counsel has
performed a reasonable investigation of the facts of the particular
case, the investigation has produced facts which provide a viable
defense on the law or facts reasonably in dispute that, if true,
would provide a viable defense, counsel has observed reasonable
professional standards in investigating the law, and the actions
taken in considering settlement and developing an effectuating a
legal strategy are reasonable in light of the facts and law.
Conversely, evidence of a lack of probable cause, in addition to the
rare statements by company or counsel conceding the lack of a
reasonable belief in the action taken, include a failure to fully
investigate the facts and law relevant to the individual case,
misrepresentations, destruction of evidence, filing a general denial
in a case in which liability or special damages are clear, or a
program of treating all cases of a certain type alike despite the
potential for individual variation. In the case of the insurance
company in particular, violations of provisions of an unfair claims
settlement practices act are evidence of lack of probable cause.
Unfair claims practices under the NAIC Model Act include:
Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for
the prompt investigation of claims arising under
[insurance] policies;
Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 675. See DOBBS, supra note 94, at
1230.
154. DeVaney v. Thriftway Marketing Corp., 953 P.2d 277, 285 (N.M.
1997); Bradshaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 1313, 1319
(Ariz. 1988).
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and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which
liability has become reasonably clear;
Compelling insureds or beneficiaries to institute suits to
recover amounts due under its policies by offering
substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in suits brought by them ....

155

The next element of the cause of action is that the defensive
action be taken with malice or, in more modern terms, for an
improper purpose. 15 6 The purpose of the civil justice system is the
"proper adjudication" of claims; 157 bringing or defending a suit for
any other purpose is a perversion of the system and provides the
basis of a cause of action. Improper purpose is a subjective
standard, speaking to the defendant's intent, but, as with other
issues of intent, it can be inferred from objective evidence. 158
The Restatement comments suggest a number of typical
situations of malicious prosecution in which improper purpose is
clear, 159 and these can easily be related to malicious defense.
First, "when the person bringing the civil proceedings is aware
that his claim is not meritorious."1 60 On the defense side, the
identical situation arises when the company mounts a defense
that it knows to be lacking in merit on the facts or law. This is an
application of the maxim often applied to malicious prosecution
that absence of probable cause gives rise to an inference of
malice.

16 1

Second, "when the proceedings are initiated for the purpose of
forcing a settlement that has no relation to the merits of the claim.
This occurs, for example when a plaintiff, knowing that there is no
real chance of successful prosecution of a claim, brings a 'nuisance
suit' upon it for the purpose of forcing the defendant to pay a sum
of money in order to avoid the financial and other burdens that a
defense against it would put upon him."'162 On the defense side,
155. NAIC Model Act § 4 c-e.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674.
157. Id. § 676.
158. See DOBBS, supra note 94, at 1231 (making knowing or reckless
falsehoods is evidence of improper purpose).
156.

159.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §676 cmt. c.

160. Id.
161. See Givelber, supra note 95, at 46.
162.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c.
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the analogous behavior occurs when the insurance company
mounts a defense or refuses to settle to impose costs on the
plaintiff with the purpose of coercing an unfairly low settlement.
This behavior is also prohibited by the unfair claims settlement
practices acts, as tactics that "compel insureds or beneficiaries to
institute suits to recover amounts due under its policies by
offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered
in suits brought by them"'16 3 or "make known to insureds or
claimants a policy of appealing from arbitration awards in favor of
insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling them to accept
settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in
arbitration."

164

Third, "when a defendant files a counterclaim, not for the
purpose of obtaining proper adjudication of the merits of that
claim, but solely for the purpose of delaying expeditious treatment
of the original cause of action."'16 5 Once the hurdle barring a
wrongful litigation claim for defensive tactics is surmounted, there
is no difference between delaying expeditious treatment by filing a
counterclaim and by mounting an improper defense.
The third element of the malicious prosecution or defense
action is that the prior action was terminated favorably to the
plaintiff. This element requires that the prior action be finally
resolved and that the judgment in favor of the plaintiff have been
upheld on appeal, if any were brought. The requirement avoids
relitigation of the facts of the prior case, limiting the scope of the
wrongful litigation action and preventing the possibility of
inconsistent verdicts. It also requires that the wrongful litigation
be brought in a separate, subsequent proceeding and cannot be
joined in the initial action.
In a malicious defense action, the requirement that the
plaintiff have prevailed in the previous action removes a large
class of insurance company intransigence from the scope of the
tort. In many cases the insurance company will mount a defense
or delay the case but eventually settle, often requiring a defendant
under financial pressure to settle on less favorable terms than it

163.

MODEL UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRAc. ACT

§ 4.E.

164. Plitt & Kriegsfield, supra note 57, at 1263-64 (internal quotations
omitted).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 cmt. c.
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might otherwise. Because a settlement is not an adjudication, the
settlement is not a termination favorable to the plaintiff.
Moreover, as a practical matter the company only will settle if it
receives a release of all claims against it, which would include the
wrongful litigation claim. Therefore, in these cases the malicious
defense action will not be available. That does not mean, however,
that it is of no value to the plaintiff. If a malicious defense action
is available, it raises the company's potential cost and therefore
raises the expected value of the litigation to the plaintiff. Subject
to all the qualifications of the bargaining dynamics, this increase
in expected value should cause some cases to go to trial that might
not otherwise and others to settle for a higher value.
The final element of the malicious prosecution action in a
minority of jurisdictions is that the plaintiff must have suffered
"special injury" as a result of the previous litigation. 16 6 It is
common in litigation to suffer expense and emotional distress and,
where the litigation is wrongfully brought, injury to reputation. 167
The special injury requirement distinguishes this loss from the
qualitatively different injury from, for example, seizure of
property through court process. 16 8 Jurisdictions that require
special injury may be less receptive to the malicious defense tort,
as they are to the basic tort of malicious prosecution.
2. Abuse of process. Abuse of process requires that one use an
element of civil process in an improper way for an improper
purpose. 16 9 Unlike malicious prosecution, the evil here is not
initiating litigation or obtaining process wrongfully, but misusing
the process for a purpose for which it was not designed. 170 Any
use of civil process is likely to cause harm and provoke distress,
but actual purpose, not just awareness, is required, and the use
itself must be "so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate
function as a reasonably justifiable litigation procedure.' 17 1 Often
166.
167.
168.
169.

DOBBS, supra note 94, at 1234.
Id.
Id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS

§ 682; DOBBS, supra note 94, at

1234.

170. Some courts require more than the ordinary use of the process, such
as seizure of property, but most focus on the improper use rather than the
particular form. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 1234-35; Mootz, supra note 75, at
490-503.

171. Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876, 882 (Ariz. App. 1982).
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the improper purpose is collateral to the litigation, as where the
defendant attached the plaintiffs property to coerce the payment
of money not owed, but that is a common feature but not a
requirement. 172 Bull v. McCloskey 173 illustrates that the abuse
can take place in the context of a single suit.17 4 "Process," for
purposes of "abuse of process," has been variously defined; some
narrow definitions require the actual issuance of a writ or other
court order, but the more common approach is to regard "the
entire range of procedures incident to the litigation process" as
within its scope, including motions and discovery procedures as
1 75
well as court orders.
As with malicious prosecution, cases have suggested that the
tort is not applicable to defensive tactics, but have seldom actually
held so. 176 Two recent cases, Givens v. Mullikin17 7 and Crackel v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 17 8 both apply abuse of process to defensive
tactics and illustrate the kinds of behavior that insurance
companies frequently engage in to the detriment of accident
victims.
In general, the wrongful behavior in both cases was using the
pretrial process not for its proper purpose, "to bring out the facts
prior to trial so the parties will be better equipped to decide what
is actually at issue," 17 9 but "to wear the mettle of the opposing
party to reach a favorable termination of the cause unrelated to its
merits" 180 or "as a 'club' in an attempt to coerce them, and other
similarly situated claimants, to surrender those causes of action

172.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682

cmt. b;

DOBBS, supra note 94,

at 1234.

173.
174.

615 P.2d 957 (Nev. 1980).
Id.; See also Ace Truck & Equip. Rentals, Inc. v. Kahn, 746 P.2d 132

(Nev. 1987).

175. DOBBS, supra note 94, at 1235-36; Nienstedt, 651 P.2d at 880-81.
176. See, e.g., Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 718 P.2d 77 (Cal. 1986);
Athridge v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 163 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2001). See
Mootz, supra note 75, at 508-11; William J. Appel, Annotation, Liability
Insurance: Third Party's Right of Action for Insurer's Bad-faith Tactics
Designed To Delay Payment of Claim, 62 A.L.R.4th 1113 (1988).
177. 75 S.W.3d 383 (Tenn. 2002).
178. 92 P.3d 882 (Ariz. App. 2004).
179. Givens, 75 S.W.3d at 402 (citing Ingram v. Phillips, 684 S.W.2d 954,
958 (Tenn. App. 1984)).
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18 1
that sought only modest damages."'
In Givens the wrong was discovery abuse. 182 The defendant
law firm (for which the insurance company was vicariously liable
because of its direction of the process) issued more than 230
interrogatories and subjected the plaintiff to a lengthy deposition
even though much of the information sought was "either already
in the defendant's possession, not relevant to the issues in
litigation, or otherwise not reasonably calculated to lead to
discoverable information."' 18 3 The firm also issued more than
seventy subpoenas for medical records and other documents
containing information embarrassing to the plaintiff not relevant
to the case, and for privileged information from the plaintiffs

psychologist.

1 84

In Crackel, Allstate had developed a scheme to limit its
liability for "minor-impact, soft-tissue" (MIST) claims in a manner
that demonstrated abuse of process, in part, because of the failure
The scheme involved making
to individualize claims. 185
unreasonably low offers and taking many cases to trial to make
the claims economically unfeasible for victims' attorneys and to

present obstacles to "a realistic settlement."' 186 In the particular
case, for example, Allstate presented an offer-of-judgment of $101
even though it knew that its insured was one hundred percent
negligent, and the plaintiffs had documented medical expenses of
$1,600. It also required the plaintiffs to submit to medical
evaluations even though they had not sought or received any care
after the initial accident. Allstate took the position in arbitration
that the case had no value, appealed the arbitration award that
its adjuster conceded was "not bad." Finally, it failed to file a
complete pretrial memorandum and participate in good faith in a
18 7
mandatory settlement conference.
181. Crackel, 92 P.3d at 890.
182. 75 S.W.3d at 391.
183. Id. at 402.
184. Id. at 402-03.
185. 92 P.3d at 890.
186. Id.
187. One bar to the application of abuse of process in some jurisdictions is
a broad litigation privilege for statements or conduct. Traditionally the
litigation privilege protected statements made in the course of litigation,
particularly statements by witnesses, against further actions, notably but not
exclusively actions for defamation. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 36 (2006); RESTATEMENT
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CONCLUSION

Conservatives and business interests marching under the
banner of tort reform have substantially undermined tort law's
objectives of promoting safety, compensating injuries, and
furthering fairness. Genuine tort reform should focus on issues in
which those objectives are inadequately served and devise
solutions to promote the objectives. The actions of insurance
companies in delaying and denying fair treatment of justified
personal injury claims presents such an issue. The history of tort
law demonstrates the ability of courts and legislatures to adapt
existing doctrines and to create new doctrines to solve problems
and serve the public interest in a vibrant body of tort law. The
adoption of the measures proposed in this article will help restore
balance to tort law and promote safety, compensation, and
fairness.

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 587. A few jurisdictions, of which California is the most
notable, have gone much farther, immunizing acts as well as statements and
thereby essentially eviscerating the abuse of process tort. See Mootz, supra
note 75, at 496-98.

